This article examines whether and how the Euro crisis has affected the long-term trends of politicization of Europe in France. Has the crisis fuelled the extent of politicization? Do we observe shifts in specific aspects of Europe being politicized? Are the patterns of opposition changing? To answer these questions, the authors compare the electoral campaign in 2012 with all French campaigns since 1974. Additionally, France is put in a broader comparative perspective. Politicization is conceptualized as three inter-related dimensions: issue salience, actor expansion, and polarization. Methodologically, the article is based on a relational content analysis of newspaper articles. The findings show that the Euro crisis boosted the level of politicization, and economic policies as well as justification frames became more important. However, the degree of polarization was higher in election campaigns that focused more on constitutional conflicts over membership and were dominated by concerns with national identity and sovereignty.
Introduction
The spotlight has been on the politics dimension of European integration studies since the mid-2000s. In this context, the concept of politicization has become key to understanding recent transformations (see de Wilde 2011) . This is most prominent in Hooghe and Marks' (2009) programmatic article that puts politicization center stage of a new post-functionalist theory of European integration. More specifically, Hooghe and Marks argue that Europe has become politicized in electoral and referendum campaigns, and that we witness a shift from "permissive consensus" to a period characterized by "constraining dissensus" in the post-Maastricht era. Similarly, 2008) show that conflicts over European integration have become more salient in party competition in Western Europe since the 1990s. This is part and parcel of a broader transformation of political conflict, which is caused by the on-going opening-up of economic, cultural, and political borders. In contrast with these arguments, other authors argue that European integration clearly has the potential to change domestic politics, but underscore that the issue has not yet been politicized by political parties (e.g., GreenPedersen 2012; van der Eijk and Franklin 2004) .
The current Euro crisis tends to refute the "skeptics" since European affairs have become more visible in the public sphere, and citizens are reminded, almost on a daily basis, of the enormous interdependencies among European economies and societies.
Furthermore, earlier economic crises have been major drivers of politicization and political realignments (e.g., Gourevitch 1984) . Thus, many observers see the current crisis as yet another major event fuelling the politicization of Europe, and bringing public contestation into the world of European decision making (e.g., Statham and Trenz 2012b) . In the words of Statham and Trenz (2012b) :"The Eurozone crisis has an extraordinarily high potential for generating a deep and on-going politicization of the EU within national domestic politics across the region" (p.18f.).
By studying party contestation, this article adds to the previous contributions of this special issue that looked at public opinion only. These studies indicated a growing anti-European sentiment among citizens as reflected in increasingly negative evaluations of EU membership or distrust towards European institutions (see Braun and Tausendpfund, this volume; Clements et al., this volume; Roth et al., 
this volume).
However, shifts in public opinion are only latent potentials as long as they are not mobilized by collective political actors and reflected in citizens' behavior. That is why this article looks at how political parties publicly contest European integration in election campaigns. Obviously, the Euro crisis is a crucial moment in the history of European integration (see Tosun et al, this volume) , but we still lack sufficient information both on the magnitude of politicization induced by the crisis, as well as on the way the crisis has changed the existing conflicts over Europe.
More precisely, we contribute to the debate by studying how the Euro crisis has affected the long-term trends of politicization in France. While Schimmelfennig (this volume) is certainly right that the crisis has boosted politicization, we argue that more detailed studies are needed which focus not just on the extent, but also on the kind of politicization induced by the crisis. This will allow us to draw more precise conclusions about how citizens' changing preferences and party contestation amidst the crisis may affect the future of European integration. This is because not all kinds of politicization may negatively influence further integration only.
This article takes a first important step by providing such an in-depth analysis for the French case. France is a paradigmatic case both because of its key role in the European integration project and because of earlier episodes of politicization. First, besides Germany, France is seen as the motor behind the integration process in general and a key player in the Eurozone more specifically. Thus, increasing politicization in France may influence the political climate in the EU and future steps of integration more than if this happens in smaller and more peripheral states (Wilde and Zürn 2012, 149) . A good example is increasing politicization related to the EU accession of Turkey in France (and Germany), which negatively affected the negotiation process (see, e.g., Koenig et al. 2006) . Second, Eurosceptic mobilization in France shows the typical pattern of the inverted U-curve: This is because of economically based opposition from the far left and identity-or sovereignty-based opposition from the far right.
Empirically, we study the public debate among political parties as it unfolds during national election campaigns through relational content analysis of newspaper This article is structured as follows. The next section presents the way in which we conceptualize politicization. Thereafter, we present the hypotheses. Here, we draw on general ideas about what drives politicization and on the findings for earlier episodes of politicization in France. Next, the methods and data are introduced, which is followed by the empirical findings. We conclude with a summary and by coming back to the post-functionalist argument. More precisely, we emphasize what our results suggest in view of Hooghe and Marks's (2009) claim that politicization has a "constraining" effect on the elites involved in European decision making.
A Multi-Dimensional Concept of Politicization
We adopt a broad understanding of politicization and take seriously its multidimensional character (see also de Wilde 2011). More precisely, we follow Hutter and Grande (forthcoming) by conceptualizing politicization as three inter-related dimensions: issue salience, actor expansion, and polarization.
The first dimension takes into account that only topics that are frequently raised by political actors in public debates can be considered politicized. Thus, salience refers to the visibility of a given issue in public debates. If an issue is not debated in public, it can be politicized only to a very limited extent if at all. This mirrors recent proposals by Green-Pedersen (2012) and by Guinaudeau and Persico (2013) , who suggest looking at politicization through the lens of salience. The second dimension is the expansion of the actors involved in a public debate. With respect to European integration, this dimension assesses the degree to which the dominant executive actors are joined by other actors in the public debate. The assumption is that, as long as only executive politicians publicly debate European integration, the issue is not fully politicized (see Statham and Trenz 2012a, p.79ff.) . This article focuses on election campaigns, in which political parties compete for votes. Therefore, the expansion of the scope of actors refers to the degree to which not only party-affiliated actors in government but also party actors without a government function emphasize European issues (e.g., opposition leaders or spokespersons in parliament). Finally, the third dimension of politicization refers to the degree of polarization, i.e., the intensity of conflict over an issue among the various actors. Thus, to speak of a highly politicized constellation, actors need to put forward differing positions and we must find strong opposing camps.
To get an overall measure for the level of politicization, we combine the three dimensions with the help of an index. Following Hutter and Grande (forthcoming), this index of politicization emphasizes the key importance of salience by multiplying it with the sum of the other two dimensions: p = × ( + ). As in any index, the proposed measure clearly hides some of the nuanced findings based on the three individual dimensions. However, the index helps us in not overemphasizing high levels of actor expansion and polarization when the salience is low because the two dimensions are actually not visible to the public in this case.
Politicizing Europe in the French Context
France is a paradigmatic case with respect to the key driving forces behind the politicization of Europe. In the following, we illustrate this by referring to the literature and earlier episodes of politicization in France. Generally speaking, the literature focuses on two sets of variables to explain differing levels and forms of politicization over time and across contexts. First, authors highlight that the increasing level and scope of integration is a key force that drives the politicization process. As de Wilde and Zürn (2012) argue, "the rising politicization of European integration is primarily a reaction to the increasing authority of the EU over time" (p.140). The more European institutions exercise authority over citizens, the more they become the object and addressee in political controversies. Hooghe and Marks (2009) add that the effects of these authority shifts have been amplified because they are embedded in a broader breakdown of national boundaries and because of peoples' fairly stable (and, for a large part, exclusively national) identities (see also Kriesi et al. 2008; .
Second, the role of political actors and their mobilization strategies is stressed.
While the processes described so far may give rise to potentials and focal points for contestation, actors need to mobilize these tensions so that they become politically manifest. Thus, as Hooghe and Marks (2009) More precisely, three party strategies have been stressed in this context: "position taking", "selective emphasis", and "framing". To put it simply, the literature indicates that radical right-wing parties have been successful in politicizing Europe because they challenge the pro-European consensus of mainstream parties, put the issue high on the agenda, and emphasize its consequences for national sovereignty and identity. By doing so, they have been able to map European issues onto a second non-economic conflict dimension in West European political spaces, which cross-cuts the traditional economic left/right divide.
Previous episodes of politicization in France illustrate these points. Set in motion by the rise of the populist right, the "redefinition of cultural conflicts as well as the emergence of the issue of European integration on the political agenda has produced far-reaching changes in the structure of oppositions in the French party system" (Bornschier and Lachat 2009, p. 361) . More importantly, it has given rise to a tri-polar conflict constellation, composed of the left, the moderate right, and the populist right Based on the general expectations and earlier episodes of politicization, we propose two hypotheses. Generally speaking, we conceive the Euro crisis and the measures taken to cope with it as constituting yet another critical event and threshold within the integration process (Tosun et al., this volume) . As indicated above, such thresholds have been key moments of politicization. They accentuate the tensions induced by integration and draw public attention to European affairs. Furthermore, the way the crisis and the management of it unfold has given rise to many focal points for contention. Amongst others, European leaders have met not just for a few but for many "critical" European summits and have adopted a range of measures to cope with the crisis. In a comparative perspective, the increase in politicization is expected to be more pronounced in Eurozone member states, countries economically hit by the crisis, and key states within the European decision-making arena. All this holds for the French case.
1
Our expectation that the crisis fuels the politicization process is quite straightforward, but has it also affected the conflict constellation? Statham and Trenz (2012b) argue that it is crucial to understand that the new wave of politicization is "driven by redistributive conflicts both within and across member states, and this is how it has expressed itself through public contestation" (p. 18f). Likewise, Serricchio et al. (2013) expect that economic considerations have a stronger effect on individual attitudes towards Europe in times of crisis (see also Braun and Tausenpfund, this volume) . Following this argument, we expect that the economic nature of the crisis may well accentuate a trend that has already been visible in France. As stated, France is a paradigmatic case with respect to both types of Euroscepticism: economic-and identitybased. Thus, we expect that conflicts over economic issues, as well as framing strategies referring to the economic and social consequences of Europe, may become more important in times of crisis. Since the focus on economics is not exceptional in the French context, we do not expect pronounced changes regarding the patterns of opposition among political parties. Concerning the party constellation, the situation should be similar to the debate over the European Constitution; the moderate right in government is challenged by the Socialists in opposition, as well as by radical parties from both left and right. Thus, the left is expected to follow its earlier critique based on economic and social justifications while the populist right is expected to be the only political force that fundamentally opposes the European integration project by justifing its critique with reference to national sovereignty and identity.
In summary, we formulate the following two hypotheses: 
Media Data and the Core Sentence Approach
Methodologically, this article adopts the approach used by 2008) to study the transformation of political conflict in Western Europe. In a second step, we coded the articles with the help of the so-called core sentence approach. In this type of quantitative content analysis, the unit of analysis is not the whole article but the "core sentence", which consists of the most basic pieces of information of a grammatical sentence. More precisely, we focus on relations between two actors (at least one being a party actor) with a thematic reference to European integration (actor-actor sentences) as well as on relations between an actor and a
European issue (actor-issue sentences). The direction of the relationship between the two is quantified using a scale from -1 to +1 with three intermediary positions. With respect to actor-issue sentences, we also coded the frames used by the actors to justify their position towards a given European issue.
The labor-intensive manual coding of the newspaper articles resulted in 2,872 core sentences related to European integration with a share of 82.9 percent actor-issue statements and 17.1 percent actor-actor sentences. Furthermore, we can draw on 2,077 coded frames in the following analyses.
The three components of politicization are operationalized as follows: salience is measured by the share of sentences on European integration as a percentage of all sentences related to any issue. For the expansion of actors, we look at the share of nonexecutive actor statements as a percentage of all sentences on European integration. The indicator for polarization of party positions is based on Taylor and Hermann's index for ideological polarization and ranges from 0 (not polarized at all) to 1 (most polarized). In a final step, we combine the indicators in an index as described above. Obviously, such an index raises the question of how to interpret these values. Following Green-Pedersen (2012), we compare the politicization of Europe with a broader set of issues. More precisely, we calculated a benchmark by relying on the data of the Kriesi et al. project (2008; . This data is based on the same coding strategy as the one used in this article, but it covers twelve issues (e.g. welfare, budget or cultural liberalism). To ease interpretation, the following graphs show the mean and maximum values for all twelve issues, as well as for immigration as yet another new key issue of party contestation in France.
Empirical Results
To begin with, we test our hypothesis that the crisis has increased the extent of France is a case of high politicization.
[Insert Figure 1 ] Figure 2 shows the development based on the three indicators used to construct the index. In general, all three measures show that Europe has become increasingly politicized since the 1970s, and that the 2012 election campaign is an exemplary case for this trend. However, the three measures point also to interesting differences. [Insert Figure 2 ]
The previous findings support the hypothesis that Europe has become more politicized in the course of the crisis, but we do not yet know whether and how the crisis has changed the way conflicts over Europe are fought. To test our second hypothesis, considered by the actors to be inherent to a particular community.
The results in Table 1 category. This indicates that issues focused on economic integration are more polarizing in 2012 than before. Since these issues are most salient, they are responsible for the ongoing polarization of European integration in France. However, as suggested, the polarization of these economic issues did not reach the high levels recorded for the struggles over Turkish accession and the Lisbon Treaty in 2007. Third, the shift towards economics can also be seen when looking at the frames used by the parties to justify their positions. Although economic and other utilitarian frames were always more important than cultural-identitarian ones, the latest campaign differs to the postMaastricht phase. Unsurprisingly, there is a close linkage between economic issues and frames -for example, when Nicolas Sarkozy pleads for the "Buy European Act" to support the prosperity of European companies. However, populist right-wing parties were successful in framing economic issues in a cultural way in the past (see Helbling et al. 2010) . Therefore, it is very significant to note that even the Front National shifted away from a culturally-based critique.
[Insert Table 1] In addition, the findings in Table 1 show that challengers from the left and from the right have gained in visibility in the post-Maastricht period. In 2012, we need to add the "others" category to the share of radical parties because it covers statements by Debout la République, the Eurosceptic split-off from the UMP. The party drew considerable attention in the public debate, as it vehemently raised more general questions of European integration by suggesting withdrawal from the EU and other farreaching institutional reforms in order to guarantee greater national sovereignty. This contrasts with all other parties -even with the Front National -that predominantly focused on more specific measures related to solving the crisis.
Finally, we use multi-dimensional scaling (MDS) to uncover the patterns of opposition in 2012. MDS is a flexible method and allows for a representation of (dis-)similarities between pairs of objects. We focus on the representation of parties and issues in a common space. This gives us a condensed view on the actors' positions. To disentangle the economic issues, we re-grouped them in five sub-categories: Euro (in general), national efforts, ESM/ESFS, Growth+, and deepening ( Figure 3 ). First, we observe a two-dimensional structure, which mirrors the patterns found for earlier periods in France. The dominant "horizontal" dimension is due to conflicts about the right economic policies to cope with the crisis, whereas the secondary "vertical" dimension is about more fundamental questions of membership and sovereignty. More specifically, the first dimension highlights the conflict between the moderate and radical left on the one side and the moderate right on the other. The left strongly criticizes the measures already decided upon (especially the ESM) and demands shifts towards more growth-oriented and interventionist measures. The moderate right-wing UMP, by contrast, defends the measures already taken, for which it was one of the main promoters on the European level. However, the UMP's central position indicates that the French political right is not utterly against protectionist and interventionist policies (Hewlett 2012, p.419) .
The second dimension is less important, as indicated by the salience of the respective issues. The conflict centers on questions about deepening (in general) and, to a smaller degree, about how much the countries hit by the crisis should bear the costs themselves. As expected, this dimension is due to the positioning of right-wing Eurosceptic parties (this time, the Front National and DLR), which vehemently oppose further deepening and demand the maintenance of national sovereignty. While the radical left is also fairly critical regarding deepening, this was not a salient issue for them. Thus, the second dimension underscores the conflict between the radical right and the mainstream parties from left and right.
[Insert Figure 3 ] Finally, the close integration of the two spatial dimensions needs to be emphasized. This mirrors that we did not witness a strong increase in the polarization of party positions. The integration of the dimensions is mainly because the right-wing Methodologically, we relied on a relational content analysis of newspapers to study the debates as they unfolded during all election campaigns from 1974 to 2012.
This allowed us to study systematically how the political parties compete with each other over Europe, who is actually speaking as a party representative. As well as which thematic aspects are emphasized and how the actors justify their positions.
Overall, our results confirm that the crisis led to an increasing politicization in the French electoral arena (see Clift 2013; Drake 2013; Hewlett 2012; Lequesne 2012 The degree of polarization, by contrast, was clearly higher in 2007 when key questions related to deepening and Turkish accession were on the agenda. In 2012, economic issues and justification frames prevailed. This was less polarizing than a debate focused on identity-and sovereignty-based claims. The mainstream parties fought essentially about the right policy solutions to cope with the crisis, whereas it was almost exclusively the radical challengers from the right who addressed more fundamental questions related to the European project and opened-up a second conflict dimension. However, it is significant to note that even the Front National shifted away from a predominantly cultural discourse.
We share Schimmelfennig's (this volume) view that post-functionalists have so far failed to show how such politicization decisively affected the policies and institutional reforms adopted during the crisis. Yet, we would like to add that more evidence on the extent and especially the kind of politicization induced by the crisis is needed to definitely answer whether and how politicization affects the future of European integration. Politicization may not be per se lead to ever tighter constraints on transfers of political authority to the EU and the accession of new member states. The specific mobilization strategies adopted by political parties may be crucial in this regard. 3 The trends for our salience measure mirror those based on party manifestos (e.g., Guinaudeau and Persico 2013, 153) . However, the differences between the three dimensions of politicization highlight that we should not just focus on salience. 4 The issue category Euro (general) covers general statements about the Euro and "solving the Euro crisis" (10.0 % of all coded statements); National efforts covers statements about more efforts by the "debtor" countries or calls for certain countries to leave the Eurozone (10.6%); ESM/ESFS covers the two main measures adopted at the time of the election campaign (15.0%); Growth+ covers all statements for or against more support from Europe to the countries hit by the crisis or for more protectionist measures (e.g., Hollande's call for more growth-oriented measures) (27.2%); Deepening (general) covers statements for/against more fundamental reforms of EU institutions, and statements related to national sovereignty or the withdrawal from the EU (22.4%). Note: the table presents the share of issue, framing, and party families in percent of all core sentences and frames, respectively. The figure in brackets shows the degree of polarization per issue. The most important figures with respect to our second hypotheses are highlighted in bold. The list of party families is supplemented with important examples for a given category in 2012.
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